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Abstract 
 
  
In this paper we analyse the effects of all sources of the accumulation of 
nonfinancial debt (household, corporate as well as government) on 
economic growth in ten euro-area countries during the 1980-2015 period. To 
this end, we make use of three models (a baseline, an asymmetric and a 
threshold model) based on the empirical growth literature augmented by 
debt to assess whether a debt change has an impact on growth over and 
above other determinants, treating the different types of borrowers 
separately. By exploring the time series dimension in order to properly 
account for the historical experience of each country in the sample, we aim 
to detect potential heterogeneities in the relationship across euro area 
countries. Our results with both the baseline and the asymmetric models 
suggest that although the effects on nonfinancial debt accumulation clearly 
differ across countries, on average, the highest marginal impact of a rise in 
debt corresponds to the household and public sector, with an increase in 
private debt being more harmful in peripheral than in central countries; in 
contrast, the average effect of a rise in public debt does not differ between 
these two groups of countries. As for the effects of a debt increase beyond 
the turning point estimated in the threshold model, our findings indicate that 
the highest marginal impact corresponds to the household sector. 
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1. Introduction  
The perspective provided by the period of more than seven years since the start of the 
European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) sovereign debt crisis in late 2009 
highlights the fact that its origin goes beyond fiscal imbalances in euro-area countries. 
Indeed, the main causes of the debt crisis in Europe vary according to country; they reflect 
an important interconnection between public and private debt and thus, between banking 
and sovereign risk (see Singh et al., 2016). Yet one of the lessons of the recent sovereign 
crisis in the euro-area is that in some countries such as Ireland or Spain there was next to 
nothing in the key indicators of public debt that suggested the imminent catastrophe; the 
build-up of financial fragility occurred in private sector balance sheets1. 
The increase recorded by total nonfinancial debt in euro-area countries during the past 
three decades has been very significant, not only in the public sector (governments), but in 
the private sector (households and nonfinancial corporations) as well. However, while the 
unprecedented increase in public debt across EMU countries has raised serious concerns 
among economists about both its sustainability and its impact on economic growth2, they 
have taken a more nuanced position on the risks of private debt accumulation, despite its 
magnitude. Schularick (2013) points out that this attitude can be attributed to the incentive 
problems that may arise when governments, as opposed to private households and 
companies, borrow; as private sector borrowers act in their informed self-interest, they are 
assumed to bear the consequences of their actions. Nevertheless, all forms of nonfinancial 
debt, when they are high and moving upwards, are sources of justifiable concern. In 
particular, the negative implications of excessive private debt (a “debt overhang”3) for 
growth and financial stability are well documented in the literature, underscoring the need 
for private sector deleveraging in some countries.  
In a series of recent papers, some authors [see, e.g. Schularick and Taylor (2012) and Jordà 
et al. (2016a)] demonstrate that high debt levels in the private sector are not only a good 
predictor of financial crises, but also a key determinant of the intensity of the ensuing 
recession. Moreover, high private debt levels can also hamper growth even in the absence 
of a financial crisis, since the accumulation of debt involves risk (International Monetary 
                                                          
1 The important role played by private debt in euro-area sovereign debt crisis in some countries was already stressed by 
Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2013). 
2 On average, public debt reached levels about 100% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)– its highest level in 50 years – 
by the end of 2013. 
3 A situation in which a borrower’s debt service exceeds its future repayment capacity. 
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Fund, 2016a). As debt levels increase, borrowers’ ability to repay becomes progressively 
more sensitive to falls in income and sales as well as to increases in interest rates. In fact, 
high private debt can have a substantial adverse impact on macroeconomic performance 
and stability, as it hinders the ability of households to smooth their consumption and 
affects corporations’ investments. In addition, elevated debt levels can create vulnerabilities 
or amplify and transmit macroeconomic and asset price shocks throughout the economy 
[see, e.g., Sutherland and Hoeller (2012) or Fisher (1931) whose theory of business cycles 
stressed that private over-indebtedness played a key role in generating severe recessions 
(and even depressions)]. Finally, spillovers from private balance sheets to the public sector 
due to government interventions (either direct in the form of targeted programs for debt 
restructuring, or indirect through the banking sector), may weaken the fiscal position or 
increase interest rates. All the above factors may compromise public debt sustainability (see 
Jarmuzek and Rozenov, 2017)4. 
Despite the relevance of this issue, the literature examining the effects of high private debt 
levels on euro-area countries’ economic growth is very limited; the papers available do not 
focus exclusively on EMU countries but analyse the impact of private debt on economic 
growth in a broader group of economies, including some euro-area members. In particular, 
Cecchetti et al. (2011) analysed the impact of both private and public debt on 18 OECD 
countries’ growth (10 belonging to the EMU), and Lombardi et al. (2017) examined the 
effects of households’ debt on economic growth in 54 economies (11 euro-area countries). 
Conversely, more research has focused on the impact of government debt on EMU 
countries’ growth [Baum et al. (2013), Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012), Dreger and 
Reimers (2013), or Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2017) to name just a few]. 
Hence, this paper aims to fill the gap in the literature by assessing the effect of nonfinancial 
debt (households, nonfinancial corporations and governments) on economic growth in ten 
euro-area countries. To this end, we use a methodology that builds on Gómez-Puig and 
Sosvilla-Rivero (2017) and explicitly takes into account the possible heterogeneity (see, e.g., 
Erberhart and Presbitero, 2015 or Chudick et al., 2017)5 in the relationship between all 
forms of nonfinancial debt and growth across euro-area countries. We apply this 
                                                          
4 These authors also provide a quantitative assessment of the gaps between current and sustainable levels of private debt, 
identifying the key factors that drive excessive borrowing. 
5 Erberhart and Presbitero (2015) find some support for a negative relationship between public debt and long-run growth 
across countries, but no evidence for a similar (let alone common) debt threshold within countries. Similarly, Chudick et 
al. (2017) find no evidence for a universally applicable threshold effect in the relationship between public debt and 
economic growth.  
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methodology to an examination of whether the impact of a debt increase on economic 
growth might differ not only depending on the source of debt, but also on the 
idiosyncrasies of each EMU country.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the rationale for our 
analysis on the basis of the results of some preliminary descriptive analyses of the evolution 
of public and private indebtedness in euro-area countries. Section 3 provides a literature 
review. Section 4 introduces the analytical framework. Section 5 presents the data used in 
the analysis and its time series properties. Section 6 offers our empirical models. Empirical 
results are presented in Section 7. Finally, some concluding remarks and policy implications 
are provided in Section 8. 
2. Private and public indebtedness evolution in EMU countries 
As stated above, the past three decades have witnessed a remarkable rise in the total 
nonfinancial debt in euro-area economies. Therefore, in what follows, we provide some 
descriptive analyses of the behaviour of nonfinancial debt during the 1980-2015 period in 
EMU countries: specifically, the evolution of private (households and nonfinancial 
corporations), public and total nonfinancial debt-to-GDP during this period in 10 euro-
area countries6 (both central –Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and the 
Netherlands – and peripheral – Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) 7 jointly with its average 
value is shown in Figure 1. 
[Insert Figure 1 around here] 
Figure 1 contains some revealing data. Total nonfinancial debt as a percentage of GDP, as 
well as its components, rose steadily for much of the 1980-2015 period. Starting at a 
relatively modest 147 percent of GDP in 1980, 36 years later this figure had reached 304 
                                                          
6 Ireland is not included in this analysis because the Central Bank of Ireland’s Quarterly Financial Accounts only provide 
data from the first quarter of 2002.  
7 This distinction between European central and peripheral countries has been extensively used in the empirical literature. 
The two groups we consider roughly correspond to the distinction made by the European Commission (1995) between 
countries whose currencies continuously participated in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) from its 
inception and which maintained broadly stable bilateral exchange rates with each other over the sample period, and those 
countries whose currencies either entered the ERM later or suspended their participation in the ERM, as well as 
fluctuating widely in value relative to the Deutschmark. These two groups are also roughly the ones found in Jacquemin 
and Sapir (1996), who applied multivariate analysis techniques to a wide set of structural and macroeconomic indicators in 
order to form a homogeneous group of countries. Moreover, these two groups are basically the same as the ones found in 
Ledesma-Rodríguez et al. (2005) according to economic agents’ perceptions of the commitment to maintain the exchange 
rate around a central parity in the ERM, and those identified by Sosvilla-Rivero and Morales-Zumaquero (2012) using 
cluster analysis when analysing the permanent and transitory volatilities of EMU sovereign yields. More recently, Belke et 
al. (2017) used the same division of core and peripheral countries to examine business cycle synchronization in the euro-
area. 
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percent of GDP in euro-area countries. In this increase (270%), public debt accounts for 
160 percentage points and private debt for 90 percentage points. However, the average 
ratio of indebtedness in the private sector (146%) is much higher (it represents around two 
thirds of the total debt ratio) than that in the public sector (77%) throughout the period. 
The evolution of the two components of private debt considered (households and 
nonfinancial corporations) is presented in Figure 2. 
[Insert Figure 2 around here] 
Figure 2 suggests that it is nonfinancial corporations rather than households that cause the 
high debt levels registered by the private sector during the period examined (companies’ 
average debt ratio, 98%, is more than double that of families, 48%). Nonetheless, the 
growth rate of the debt during the period is higher for households (159%) than for 
nonfinancial corporations (65%).  
Therefore, the rate of increase of the debt-to-GDP ratio during the 1980-2015 period is 
very high not only for the public sector but also for households8 (close to 160% in both 
cases). Moreover, although nonfinancial corporations’ debt records a lower rate of growth 
throughout the period, it represents around 44% of total nonfinancial debt, followed by the 
public sector (35%) and households (21%).  
Tables 1a and 1b present the evolution of debt-to-GDP ratios for households, firms and 
governments during the 1980-2015 period for the EMU central and peripheral countries 
included in our sample. 
[Insert Tables 1a and 1b around here] 
Table 1a indicates that, in central countries, the highest increase in public debt took place in 
the 1980s and 1990s (before the launch of the euro), while during the decade preceding the 
onset of the crisis (from 1999 until 2009) the highest rate of growth was recorded by 
private debt (both households and nonfinancial corporations) rather than public debt.  
A similar pattern is observed in most peripheral countries (see Table 1b), where public debt 
presents a noticeable upward trend during the two decades preceding the introduction of 
                                                          
8 Household debt growth has normally been explained in the literature as a rational response of forward looking agents to 
hump-shaped time earning profiles or to temporary deviations of income from its long-run trend. So, mainstream theories 
can encompass the concept of excessive indebtedness only supposing that agents’ maximizing behaviour results from a 
less than perfect rationality and foresight (see, e.g., Barnes and Young, 2003)  
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the common currency. This led to the high values registered by the sovereign debt-to-GDP 
ratio in 2009 coinciding with the outbreak of the crisis (120%, 106% and 80% in Greece, 
Italy and Portugal respectively)9. However, during the first ten years of monetary union, the 
rate of increase of private debt also overtook that of the public sector in peripheral 
countries. In particular, households’ debt registered a rate of increase that ranges from 54% 
in Portugal to 223% in Greece, while nonfinancial corporations’ debt recorded its highest 
rate of increase in Spain (83%), followed by Greece, Portugal and Italy.  
Therefore, during the 2000s, on the eve of the recent sovereign debt crisis caused by the 
globalization of banking, rapid financial liberalization and a period of easy access to credit, 
nonfinancial private debt increased substantially in EMU Member States (both central and 
peripheral). The situation had become clearly unsustainable by the onset of the financial 
crisis. It is noticeable that during the first ten years of the euro, not only did exchange risk 
disappeare, but credit risk also fell progressively as markets perceived sovereign markets as 
a single unit, dismissing macroeconomic imbalances within euro-area countries and the 
possibility that governments might default10. As a result, along with the downward trend 
registered by sovereign bond yields, long-term interest rates also converged to very low 
values, fostering a credit expansion in the nonfinancial private sector11. So, in 2015 about 
two-thirds of total euro-area countries’ nonfinancial debt had its origin in the private 
sector12. 
In addition, Table 1b also indicates that private debt also recorded an important surge in 
some EMU peripheral countries, not only during the 2000s but also during the two decades 
before the start of the monetary union. In particular, during the 1980s the rate of growth of 
households’ debt was 225% in Italy and 65% in Spain, while it increased notably in 
Portugal and Greece (193% and 85% respectively) during the 1990s. In that decade, firms’ 
                                                          
9 It is noticeable that in other EMU peripheral countries such as Spain, with a debt-to-GDP ratio in 2009 close to 50%, 
considerably below the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) ceiling, it seems that it was private rather than public debt that 
triggered the crisis. 
10 Nevertheless, with the financial crisis the picture changed completely and sovereign long term interest rates rose 
sharply. Indeed, the crisis put the spotlight on the macroeconomic and fiscal imbalances within EMU countries which 
had largely been ignored during the 1999-2009 period (see Gómez-Puig et al., 2014). 
11Alves and Pereira (2017) examine the dramatic indebtedness increase among households in Portugal, detecting a 
structural break around 1992, which may correspond to the signing of the Maastricht Treaty which ultimately led to this 
decline in interest rates and consequently the increase in indebtedness.  
12A similar pattern has been registered by non-EMU countries. According to the International Monetary Fund (2016a), 
the global gross debt of the nonfinancial sector — comprising the general government, households, and nonfinancial 
firms — has more than doubled in nominal terms since the turn of the century, reaching $152 trillion in 2015 – i.e., which 
225 per cent of world GDP. About two-thirds of this debt consists of liabilities of the private sector.  
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debt also registered notable rises in Portugal and Italy (104% and 45% respectively). 
Finally, of course, ex post, the severe financial crisis and economic recession would damage 
public finances via crashing revenues and rising cyclical expenditures, and consequently 
fuelling the public debt increase. Hence, during the 2009-2012 period, the public sector 
registered the highest rise in debt levels in all peripheral countries, with especially high 
increases in Spain (66%) and in Portugal (56%), while private debt began a deleveraging 
trend. 
All in all, some interesting insights can be drawn from Figures 1 and 2 and Tables 1a and 
1b, and they in fact motivate the analysis presented in this paper. First, during the last three 
decades debt evolution was significant not only in the public sector but in the private sector 
as well, providing one reason why economists and policy makers should take private sector 
indebtedness as seriously as public indebtedness. Second, private sector credit growth, not 
public debt accumulation, provides the key to understanding the build-up of the sovereign 
debt crisis in some euro-area countries. Third, the tendency to socialize the losses from 
private sector financial crisis has grown; they have become a key risk factor for public 
finances and have fostered the tight link between the private credit cycle and the fiscal 
cycle. Fourth, since high debt levels in the private sector are a determining element of the 
strength of the following recession (see Jordà et al., 2016a), examining their nexus with 
economic growth emerges as a key topic that deserves economists’ attention (especially in 
euro-area countries with their fierce banking, sovereign and economic crisis). Finally, 
today’s unprecedented indebtedness levels (in both the public and the private sector) in 
EMU countries should be a matter of concern as long as the expected normalization in the 
future European Central Bank’s monetary policy could push up long-term interest rates. In 
that case, interest expenses on the debt would start to increase borrowers’ risk and 
eventually lead to a debt overhang, with the subsequent adverse effect on economic 
growth.  
We should stress that Ireland’s debt evolution is not included in Figures 1 and 2 and Tables 
1a and 1b because private debt data are only available in this country from the first quarter 
of 2002 onwards. So, despite the relevance of private debt in the Irish economy (see Lydon 
and McIndoe-Calder, 2017), due to these data restrictions, in this paper we analyse the 
impact of nonfinancial debt (households, nonfinancial corporations and governments) on 
economic growth in ten EMU countries (excluding Ireland from the analysis) during the 
1980-2015 period.  
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3. Literature review 
Until the recent crisis, economists worried mainly about public debt, not about private 
debt. The warning signs of increased private leverage in the run-up to the crisis of 2008 
were largely ignored. However, as shown in Figures 1 and 2, the increase in euro-area debt 
levels during the last 36 years was due to the behaviour not only of the public sector, but of 
the private sector as well, in particular of households. Moreover, firms’ debt, which shows 
the highest share of total debt throughout the period, represents an important potential 
burden for the recovery of the economies. As it turns out, in 2015 only about one third of 
total debt in EMU countries corresponds to public debt accumulation. In other words, the 
overwhelming share of the debt increase has been due to higher borrowing by households 
and nonfinancial companies.  
Therefore, economists should not disregard private sector leveraging; in fact they should 
pay as much attention to it as they do to public debt. The literature on this topic is still 
scarce, but not non-existent. One strand of the literature has focused on the relationship 
between the different forms of debt. Angeletos et al. (2016) highlighted that government 
debt expansions significantly influence households’ financial condition; investigating the 
impact of government debt on corporate financing decisions, Demirci et al. (2017) found a 
negative relation between government debt and corporate leverage using data on 40 
countries during the 1990-2014 period; and Uusküla (2016) examined the relationship 
between more than 30 macroeconomic variables and debt-to-GDP ratios for household, 
nonfinancial corporation and aggregate debt in a panel of European Union countries.  
Another strand of literature examines the effects that the generalized and necessary 
deleveraging process currently taking place in the private sector may have on economic 
activity [see Crowe et al. (2011), Ruscher and Wolff (2013), Cuerpo et al. (2015) or 
Kuvshinov et al. (2016)]. Other authors (see, e. g., Bernardini and Peersman, 2015; Klein, 
2016) have shown that the effects of fiscal consolidations crucially depend on the level of 
private indebtedness (mostly household leveraging), whereas the state of the business cycle 
and the level of public debt play only a minor role in the effectiveness of fiscal policy13.  
                                                          
13 Additionally, Klein and Winkler (2017) provide empirical evidence supporting the view that fiscal consolidations lead to 
a strong and persistent increase in income inequality during periods of private debt overhang. 
14 For example, it is well documented that in the U.S. during the financial crisis, the households that took subprime loans 
were much more prone to foreclosure and bankruptcy (Li and White, 2009).   
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Finally, some recent contributions have pointed to the important role of private debt for 
the propagation and amplification of shocks, since a high level of indebtedness may render 
the economy more vulnerable to negative shocks than otherwise. Mian and Sufi (2017) 
showed that an increase in the household debt to GDP predicts lower subsequent GDP 
growth and higher unemployment; Jordà et al. (2016b) found that more mortgage-intensive 
credit expansions tend to be followed by deeper recessions and slower recoveries, but that 
this effect is not present for non-mortgage credit booms14; using data for 31 OECD and 20 
emerging market countries Randveer et al. (2011) found that a higher level of private debt 
before a recession is correlated with lower economic growth after the economic slowdown 
has finished; using microeconomic data for the United States Garriga et al. (2017) reported 
that most forms of private debt (mortgages, credit card debt, and auto loans) had 
significant boom-bust cycles; and Guerini et al. (2017) investigated the causal effects of 
public and private debts on U.S. output dynamics.  
Nonetheless, the literature that has centred on the effects of high private debt levels on 
euro-area countries’ economic growth is very limited and only includes papers that, instead 
of focusing on EMU countries, analyse the impact in a broader group that includes some 
euro-area members [Cecchetti et al. (2011) or Lombardi et al. (2017)]. Therefore, this paper 
aims to fill the gap existing in the literature by examining the effect of all sources of 
nonfinancial debt (private and public) on economic growth in a sample of ten EMU 
countries which have recently endured a severe financial and economic crisis. Our objective 
is to analyse whether the effect of debt accumulation depends on the source of debt 
(households, companies or governments) and on the idiosyncrasies of the different 
countries.  
4. Analytical framework 
Econometrics is concerned with drawing inferences about economic relationships from 
observed data using economic models that are inevitably incomplete characterizations of 
the complicated reality of economic life. Therefore, the crucial decision in all empirical 
studies concerns the set of variables for which observations should be collected and then 
analysed in order to describe the salient features of the economic world. Following both 
the relevant economic theory and the previous empirical knowledge, our analytical strategy 
incorporates the specification and estimation of a growth equation based on the empirical 
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growth literature (e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004) augmented by debt to assess whether 
the latter has an impact on growth over and above other determinants. 
The initial empirical specification is derived from the neoclassical growth model, stating 
that the growth rate of real per capita GDP (gt) for a given country is given by: 
1
1
n
t t i it t t
i
g y X d    

        (1) 
where yt-1 is the logarithm of initial real per capita GDP (to capture the “catch-up effect” or 
conditional convergence of the economy to its steady state), Xit (i=1, …, n) is a set of 
explanatory regressors and dt is the debt-to-GDP ratio. Following Cecchetti et al. (2011), 
household (hdt), corporate (cdt) and public (pdt) debt are treated separately. 
Regarding Xt, we consider a set of explanatory variables that have been shown to be 
consistently associated with growth in the literature: population growth rate (POPGRt); the 
ratio of gross savings to GDP (GSt); life expectancy at birth, a proxy for the level of human 
capital (HKt)15; openness to trade, measured by the absolute sum of exports and imports 
over GDP (OPENt); and CPI inflation, a measure of macroeconomic instability and 
uncertainty (INFt). 
In the economic growth literature, the rate of growth of labour used in the production 
process is a key determinant of growth (Solow, 1956 or Frankel, 1962). So POPGRt is used 
to proxy country size and the rate of labour growth. The empirical evidence suggests that 
the relationship between population and economic growth is mixed and varies between 
countries. Some empirical studies suggest that the relationship is negative and insignificant 
(Levine and Renelt, 1992); others find a negative and significant association (Mankiw et al., 
1992), while still others present evidence of a positive relationship (Sachs and Warner, 
1997). The population growth rate, then, has been found to exhibit either a positive or a 
negative relationship with economic growth.  
As for the relationship between economic growth and savings, according to many literature 
reports a positive and statistically significant impact of GSt on economic growth is 
                                                          
15 This proxy is also used by Sachs and Warner (1997). Other proxies commonly used for human capital such as years of 
secondary education and school enrollment in secondary were only available from 1980. Additionally, the proxy years of 
secondary education did not change during the sample period. As shown in Jayachandran and Lleras-Muney (2009), 
longer life expectancy encourages human capital accumulation, since a longer time horizon increases the value of 
investments that pay out over time. Moreover, better health and education are complementary with longer life expectancy 
(Becker, 2007). Indeed, life expectancy at birth correlates strongly with the index of human capital per person provided by 
the Penn World Table (version 8.0, Feenstra et al., 2013), based on years of schooling (Barro and Lee, 2013) and returns 
to education (Psacharopoulos, 1994). 
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expected, since increased savings may stimulate economic growth through increased 
investment (Keynes, 1936). This approach is supported by the growth models proposed by 
Harrod (1939), Domar (1946) and Solow (1956).   
HKt is included to reflect the notion that countries with an abundance of human capital are 
more likely to be able to attract investors, absorb ideas from the rest of the world, and 
engage in innovation activities (Grossman and Helpman, 1991). While some studies have 
found a positive relationship between human capital and economic growth (Radelet et al., 
2001), others have found a negative relationship (Barro, 2003). Consequently, the effect of 
human capital on economic growth is expected to be either positive or negative. OPENt is 
posited to boost productivity through transfers of knowledge and efficiency gains 
(Seghezza and Baldwin, 2008). Since most of the empirical literature [Romer (1992), Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin (1995), or Edwards (1998), among others] provides evidence of the 
positive impact of openness on growth, a positive sign is expected for this variable. Finally, 
with regard to INFt, it has been argued that inflation is a good macroeconomic indicator of 
how the government manages the economy [see Fischer (1993) or Barro (2003), just to 
name a few] and that low inflation brings about economic efficiency because, through the 
price mechanism, economies are able to allocate scarce resources to their best economic 
use (World Bank, 1990). Nonetheless, the a priori expectation may be either a positive or 
negative association between inflation and economic growth. This presumable uncertain 
effect is supported by the different arguments presented in the literature regarding the 
relationship between these two variables. While some authors defend a negative 
relationship, others support a positive one. The former group includes De Gregorio (1993), 
who suggests that inflation can increase the cost of capital, reducing capital accumulation 
and lowering its productivity, and thus inhibiting long-run growth; Friedman (1977), who 
conjectures that inflation uncertainty would reduce the effectiveness of the price 
mechanism to coordinate economic activities, decreasing the output growth rate; and 
Fischer (1993) or Bruno and Easterly (1998), who stress the negative relationship between 
inflation and growth especially via their impact on the efficiency of physical capital. On the 
other hand, the latter group includes Tobin (1965), who argues that higher anticipated 
inflation can increase capital per head as households shift their (portfolio) assets away from 
real money balances (non-interest-bearing money) toward real capital (more productive 
forms), and Dotsey and Sarte (2000), who contend that inflation makes the return to 
money balances uncertain and reduces the demand for real money balances and 
14 
 
consumption; this increases precautionary savings and, in response to higher anticipated 
inflation, the investment pool enhances economic growth. 
5. Data and time series properties 
5.1. Data   
As mentioned above, we use annual data for ten EMU countries: both central (Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands) and peripheral countries (Greece, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain). We use long spans of data covering the period 1980-2015 (i.e., a 
total of 36 annual observations) to explore the dimension of historical specificity and to 
capture the underlying relationship between the variables under study. 
To maintain as much homogeneity as possible for a sample of ten countries over the 
course of five decades, we use the World Bank’s World Development Indicators16 as our 
primary source, supplemented with data from Cecchetti et al. (2011), the European 
Commission’s AMECO database and the International Monetary Fund (International 
Financial Statistics 2016b). As stated above, we use per capita GDP at 2010 market prices, 
population growth rate, the ratio of gross savings to GDP, an index of human capital, 
openness to trade and consumer price inflation. The precise definitions and sources of the 
variables are presented in Appendix 1. 
5.2. Time series properties 
Our approach focuses on time series analyses of yearly data for individual countries which 
can help us to document the possible differences in their experiences. This approach is 
likely to provide an accurate empirical estimate of the underlying debt-growth nexus in 
EMU countries. 
Since the appropriate econometric treatment of a model depends crucially on the pattern of 
stationarity and non-stationarity of the variables under study, before carrying out the 
estimation we test for the order of integration of the variables by means of the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests. This step is necessary to ensure that all our variables in the 
regression equation have the same order of integration, given the non-stationarity that most 
macroeconomic data exhibit. The results decisively reject the null hypothesis of a unit root 
at conventional significance levels for gt, INFt, POPGRt and GSt (indicating that they are 
stationary in levels, i.e., I(0)), while we do not reject the null for yt, hdt, cdt, pdt, OPENt and 
                                                          
16 http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators 
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HKt (suggesting that these variables can be treated as first-difference stationary, i.e., I(1))
17. 
Then, following Cheung and Chinn’s (1997) suggestion, we confirm these results using the 
KPSS tests (Kwiatkowski et al. 1992), where the null is a stationary process against the 
alternative of a unit root18.  
6. Empirical models 
6.1. Baseline empirical model 
Given that our dependent variable is stationary (i.e., its statistical properties such as mean, 
variance, autocorrelation, etc., remain constant over time), we cannot explain it with non-
stationary variables (whose statistical properties change over time). Additionally, if the 
variables in the regression model are not stationary, then the standard assumptions for 
asymptotic analysis will not be valid and we cannot undertake hypothesis tests about the 
regression parameters. Therefore, by differencing the non-stationary variables we transform 
them into stationary variables19. 
As a result of the time series properties of our data, the baseline empirical model is 
modified as follows:  
1 1 2 3 4 5t t t t t t t t tg g INF HK OPEN POPGR GS d                    (2) 
where Δ denotes the first difference operator.  
Note that model (2) is quite different from model (1), which is commonly used in the 
literature, especially regarding the variables yt-1, HK, OPEN and d, since we find that they 
are non-stationary and therefore enter our model in first differences. As argued in 
Asimakopoulos and Karavias (2016), by rewriting equation (1) as (3) 
1
1 1
l l
s s ns ns
t t i it i it t t
i i
g y X X d     
 
            (3) 
(where s
itX  and 
ns
itX denote the stationary and non-stationary explanatory variables 
respectively), we can compare (3) with our equation (2), which has 1 1t tg y   instead of 
1ty  , td  instead of td  and 
ns
itX  instead of 
ns
itX as explanatory variables due to non-
                                                          
17 These results (which are not shown here in order to save space, but are available from the authors upon request) were 
confirmed using Phillips-Perron (1998) unit root tests controlling for serial correlation and the Elliott, Rothenberg, and 
Stock (1996) Point Optimal and Ng and Perron (2001) unit root tests for testing non-stationarity against the alternative of 
high persistence. These additional results are also available from the authors. 
18 The results are not shown here due to space restrictions but are available from the authors upon request. 
19 Note that if the public debt-to-GDP ratio series contains a unit root, that would imply that the results of many previous 
studies (some of which had been used as a basis for policy recommendations) are spurious.  
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stationarity. The interpretation of the estimated parameters is the same in both models, but 
that of , 2 , 3 and  changes. 
6.2. Asymmetric model  
We proceed further by exploring the possibility of an asymmetric effect on positive and 
negative debt variation on economic growth for each country20. We use the following 
alternative empirical specification to capture this possibility: 
1 1 2 3 4 5
1 2( 0) ( 0)
t t t t t t t
t t t t t
g g INF HK OPEN POPGR GS
d I d d I d
     
  
       
        
   (4) 
where I is an indicator function that takes the value 1 if the condition is fulfilled (i.e., if Δ is 
positive or negative) and zero otherwise. The indicator variable has the effect of splitting 
the variation of debt variable into two, allowing for an asymmetric response of growth to 
debt accumulation and relief. 
6.3. Threshold model  
Identifying a threshold effect for each economy under study would inform policy makers 
of the presence of a country-specific tipping point, which would be useful information for 
guiding macroeconomic policies and fiscal adjustments21. To this end, we use the following 
alternative specification: 
1 1 2 3 4 5
* *
1 2( ) ( )
t t t t t t t
t t t t t
g g INF HK OPEN POPGR GS
d I d d d I d d
     
  
       
      
   (5) 
where I is an indicator function that takes the value 1 if the condition is fulfilled (i.e., if td  
is either below or above a specific threshold value *d ) and zero otherwise. In this case, the 
indicator variable has the effect of splitting the variation of debt variable into two, allowing 
for the impact to differ above and below the threshold. Following the common practice in 
the empirical literature, the assignment to one or the other regime is determined by the 
                                                          
20 For example, Eberhardt and Presbitero (2015) assess asymmetry in the long- and/or short-run relationship between 
public debt and growth in a large panel of countries in order to reflect the conclusions of the well-established literature on 
the asymmetric effects of fiscal policy in advanced economies (see, Sutherland, 1997; and Perotti, 1999). Nevertheless, 
their methodological approach is different from the one implemented in this paper, since we adopt a times series analysis 
instead of a panel data approach and we deal appropriately with the different order of integration of the relevant variables, 
using changes in debt-to-GDP ratio as the primary variable of interest.  
21 Baum et al. (2013), Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012), Dreger and Reimers (2013), Antonakakis (2014) and 
Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2017) have found that, for the euro-area, the relationship between public debt and 
growth is characterized by the presence of a threshold above which debt starts to have a negative effect on economic 
growth. Caution should be taken when comparing results with those presented in Baum et al. (2013), Checherita-Westphal 
and Rother (2012), Dreger and Reimers (2013) or Antonakakis (2014) due to the fact that these papers adopt a panel data 
analysis and use the debt-to-GDP ratio as the primary variable of interest. 
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debt-to-GDP ratio, allowing us to compare our results with previous papers which have 
adopted this ratio as the primary variable of interest. We evaluate all possible values for 
*,d selecting for each country the value that minimizes the sum of squared residuals from 
the regression as the relevant one. 
7. Empirical results22 
In order to assess whether the proposed models are tentatively admissible (i.e., consistent 
with the data and with economic theory), we use a data-based method for obtaining a 
parsimony representation of the data-generating process: the general-to-specific approach 
(Hendry, 1995). In this approach, the modeller simplifies an initially general model that 
adequately characterizes the empirical evidence within his or her theoretical framework. 
Starting from a general unrestricted model that contains all the variables likely to be 
relevant, and lags long enough to be able to capture a constant parameter representation, 
standard testing procedures eliminate statistically insignificant variables. Diagnostic tests 
check the validity of the reductions, ensuring a consistent final selection which produces a 
parsimonious and interpretable econometric model that is data- admissible, presents well-
behaved residuals and uses conditioning variables that are weakly exogenous (see Faust and 
Whiteman, 1997)23. This method has proved useful in practice for selecting empirical 
economic models (see Hendry, 2000).   
Given the potential for endogeneity of the explanatory variables, we use two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) instrumental variable techniques to estimate the finally selected model. In 
the case of the threshold model, we use the 2SLS estimator proposed by Caner and Hansen 
(2004). Following common practice with macroeconomic data, we use lagged terms of 
regressors as instruments.  
Recall that, in order to assess the differences between types of borrowers, household, 
corporate and government debt (hdt, cdt and pdt, respectively) are treated separately. 
                                                          
22 In each model, we focus our comments on the variation in debt to investigate its effect on growth, summarizing the 
results by pointing out the main regularities. The reader is asked to browse through Tables 2 to 4 to find evidence for 
particular country of her/his interest and for a detailed account of the impact of other explanatory variables on the 
growth rate.  
23 Phillips (1988) contends that the general-to-specific methodology performs a set of corrections that make it an optimal 
procedure under weak exogeneity. 
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7.1. Empirical results from the baseline empirical model 
Panel A in Tables 2a and 2b reports the results for peripheral and central countries 
respectively. All explanatory variables turn out to be significant and their signs are in 
concordance with the literature. The degree of country’s openness to trade, the proxy used 
to measure human capital, population growth and the ratio of gross savings to GDP have a 
positive impact on real GDP per capita growth, while the inflation rate and the ratio of debt 
over GDP exert a negative effect24.  
[Insert Table 2a and 2b around here] 
Some interesting insights emerge from the results presented in Tables 2 when analysing the 
effect of a debt increase in the three different sectors on per capita GDP growth. We 
observe that, on average in the ten countries under study, the highest marginal impact of a 
debt rise corresponds to the household and public sector (-0.2), the marginal effect of an 
increase in nonfinancial corporations’ debt being much lower (-0.1). However, there are 
important differences across countries. If there is an increase in households’ debt, the 
estimated marginal effect on growth ranges from -0.54 in Greece to -0.03 in the 
Netherlands, and the response is higher in peripheral (-0.27) than in central countries (-
0.17). A similar pattern is found when analysing the effect of an increase in nonfinancial 
firms’ debt, since the marginal impact ranges from -0.34 in Greece to -0.003 in Germany 
and, on average, the influence is also higher in peripheral (-0.19) than in central countries (-
0.09). However, even though the reaction to a public debt increase also differs across EMU 
countries (it ranges from -0.46 in Finland to -0.002 in Austria), the average value is very 
similar (close to -0.2) in central and peripheral countries.  
Summing up, the results from the baseline model suggest that although the effects on 
nonfinancial debt accumulation clearly differ across countries, on average, the highest 
marginal impact of a debt rise corresponds to the household and public sector. 
Furthermore, an increase in private debt (both households and companies) is more harmful 
in peripheral than in central countries, while the average effect of a rise in public debt does 
not differ between these two groups of countries.  
Finally, as can be seen in Panel B in Tables 2a and 2b, the estimated models seem to pass 
diagnostic tests such as normality of error term, second-order residual autocorrelation and 
                                                          
24  As pointed out in Section 4, a positive effect was expected for the variable measuring openness to trade and the ratio 
of gross savings to GDP, while a negative effect was expected for the ratio of debt to GDP. However, according to the 
literature the expected effect of human capital, population growth and inflation rate might be either positive or negative. 
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heteroskedasticity (χ2N, χ2SC and χ
2
H respectively). The overall regression fit is satisfactory, 
as measured by the adjusted R2 value (ranging from 0.5404 to 0.7575 for central EMU 
countries and from 0.5700 to 0.6979 for peripheral EMU countries). Therefore, our 
econometric modelling seems to have identified sensible and interpretable relationships 
between the economic variables under study. 
7.2 Empirical results from the asymmetric model  
As explained above, the introduction of an indicator variable in the asymmetric model has 
the effect of splitting the variation of debt variable into two, allowing for an asymmetric 
response of growth to debt accumulation and relief. 
[Insert Tables 3a and 3b around here] 
The results reported in Panel A in Tables 3 suggest that, on average, this asymmetric effect 
exists for households and governments. However, while in the households’ sector the 
positive effect of a debt relief on growth (-0.3) is higher than the negative effect of a debt 
increase (-0.2), in the governments’ sector the negative effect of a debt increase on growth 
(-0.2) is higher than the positive impact of a debt reduction (-0.1). Conversely, for 
companies, the average marginal impact of a debt increase is the same as that of a debt 
reduction (-0.1). 
Regarding the effects of debt accumulation, the marginal effect of a debt increase also 
differs across countries regardless of the type of debt, and similar patterns to those 
resulting from the baseline model are found. The marginal response of an increase of 
household debt ranges from -0.51 in Greece to -0.04 in the Netherlands and, on average, 
the marginal influence is higher in peripheral (-0.31) than in central countries (-0.16). If 
companies’ debt rises, the estimated marginal impact ranges from -0.39 in Greece to -0.04 
in the Netherlands and, on average, it is higher in peripheral (-0.19) than in central 
countries (-0.11). In the case of a positive change in public debt, the marginal reaction 
ranges from -0.46 in Finland to -0.02 in Austria but, as in the baseline model, the average 
response does not differ between central and peripheral economies (-0.2 in both groups of 
countries).  
Therefore, the effects of debt accumulation on growth resulting from the asymmetric 
model also stress the fact that an increase in private debt has a higher detrimental effect on 
economic growth in peripheral than in central countries, while the effect is very similar in 
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the two groups of countries if there is a rise in public debt. It is noticeable that in both the 
baseline and the asymmetric models an increase in private debt is especially harmful in 
Greece, while the effect of a public debt increase on Greek economic growth seems to be 
much lower.  
Tables 3 present some very important data regarding the effects of debt reduction on 
growth. On average, for the ten countries under study, a debt reduction has estimated 
marginal impacts of -0.3, -0.1 and -0.1 in the case of the household, government, and firm 
sectors respectively, indicating that while a reduction in nonfinancial corporations’ and 
public debt has a negligible effect on growth25, the response is relevant in the case of 
households.  
Nevertheless, this significant positive reaction clearly differs across countries, the average 
impact being higher in peripheral than in central countries. Specifically, the marginal impact 
of debt deleveraging in the household sector presents values of -0.74, -0.48, -0.41 and -0.19 
in Spain, Greece, Portugal and Italy respectively.  
Consequently, in view of these results and considering that households’ final consumption 
expenditure is the most important component of GDP (around 50%) in the countries 
under study, it is essential to point out that the huge increase in households’ indebtedness 
(close to 160% over the last 36 years, mainly due to mortgage loans) has represented a 
significant impediment for economic growth, since it has crowded out consumption. 
Therefore, a reduction in households’ debt (especially in EMU peripheral countries) may be 
crucial to stimulate consumption and growth; as the literature has stressed, households’ 
debt plays a very important role in shaping the business cycle. Jordà et al. (2013) show that 
the presence of a high level of household debt leads to deeper recessions, while Mian et al. 
(2013) report the channel through which this might happen. Specifically, the latter authors 
highlight the role of household debt in explaining the large decline in U.S. consumption 
during the 2006-2009 period. In particular, since they find that the marginal propensity to 
consume is much higher for poorer households or those with higher leverage, their results 
suggest that the consequences of housing wealth decline on aggregate consumption will be 
more severe the higher the level of leverage in the housing sector.   
                                                          
25  Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla Rivero (2017) also find the impact of public debt deleverage on EMU countries’ economic 
growth to be insignificant. 
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As stated above, the effects of households’ debt relief in central EMU countries (Table 3a) 
are lower than in peripheral economies. In fact, a debt reduction only presents a positive 
relevant effect in Finland and Austria. 
Finally, notice that we have conducted diagnostic tests in order to see whether our results 
are free from problems of serial autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity and nonlinearity of 
residuals. As can be seen in Panel B of Tables 3, we found that none of these problems are 
present in our estimates. Additionally, the estimated adjusted R2 statistics seem to suggest 
that a considerable fraction of the variance of the dependent variable is explained by the 
independent variables used in the regressions. 
7.3. Empirical results from the threshold model  
Panels A in Tables 4a and 4b show26 the results from the threshold model. As in the 
asymmetric model, an indicator variable has been introduced which splits the effect of the 
debt change into two, thus allowing for the impact to differ below and above the threshold 
detected. 
[Insert Tables 4a and 4b around here] 
Some interesting observations can also be drawn from Tables 4. First, it is noticeable that 
above the estimated threshold, on average, the estimated negative effect of an increase in 
public debt on growth (-0.2) is similar to the one found using the baseline or the 
asymmetric model. However, the average negative reaction to an increase in private debt 
(both households and companies) is higher above the detected tipping point in the 
threshold model than in the two previous models. In the case of households, the average 
marginal impact increases from -0.2 to -0.3, while in the case of nonfinancial corporations 
it rises from -0.1 up to -0.2. 
Second, on average, the highest thresholds are found for corporations’ debt (87%), 
followed by public debt (59%) and households’ debt (39%). Our findings reflect the fact 
that firms’ debt is, on average, twice as high as households’ debt and around one third 
higher than that of the public sector during the 1980-2015 period (see Figure 2 and Table 
1). According to our results, firms have greater room for manoeuvre to increase the level of 
indebtedness than the other sectors, and the public sector has a greater margin than 
households.  
                                                          
26 As can be seen in Panel B in Tables 4, the regressions fit reasonably well in terms of adjusted R2
 
and they pass the 
diagnostic tests against non-normal errors, autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.   
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Third, focusing on the private sector, not only are debt thresholds lower for households’ 
debt rather than for firms’ debt, but also the average marginal effect (-0.3) of a household 
debt increase on growth beyond the tipping point is higher than that of companies (-0.2). 
Moreover, in the two private sectors, thresholds are lower in peripheral than in central 
EMU countries (households’ debt thresholds present average values of 31% and 44% in 
peripheral and central countries respectively, while the average values of firms’ debt 
thresholds are 72% in peripheral and 96% in central countries) and the marginal impacts 
above them are very high in some of these peripheral economies (e.g., Greece presents a 
marginal impact of -0.76 and -0.55 beyond the 32% and 52% turning point for households’ 
and firms’ debt respectively). Therefore, these results suggest that an increase in 
households’ debt (especially in peripheral countries) exerts a higher detrimental effect on 
growth than a rise in nonfinancial corporations’ debt. Mian and Sufi (2017) show that an 
increase in the household debt-to-GDP predicts lower subsequent GDP growth and higher 
unemployment, while Jordà et al. (2016b) find that more mortgage-intensive credit 
expansions tend to be followed by deeper recessions and slower recoveries. 
Fourth, analysing the results of the threshold model for the public sector, we find that 
while the tipping point is lower in central (55%) than in peripheral (65%) countries, the 
marginal impact beyond that point is similar in the two group of countries (around -0.2). 
Focusing on peripheral countries (Table 4b), thresholds are 90%, 71%, 50% and 50% in 
Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain, while marginal impacts range from -0.3 in Spain and Italy 
to -0.2 in Portugal and -0.1 in Greece.  
All in all, Tables 4 indicate that while public debt thresholds are higher in peripheral than in 
central countries, private debt thresholds are higher in core EMU countries. These results 
suggest that while peripheral countries might have a higher capacity to increase public 
indebtedness than central ones, in the case of private indebtedness central countries are in a 
better position to increase it. Consequently, public debt accumulation might exert a more 
harmful effect on central euro-area countries’ economic growth, but the detrimental effect 
of an increase in private debt seems to be higher in peripheral countries. These results 
suggest that peripheral countries especially should be aware of the adverse consequences of 
private debt accumulation. Rather than disregarding private sector leveraging, they should 
pay it as much attention as they already do to public debt. 
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8. Concluding remarks 
Total nonfinancial debt as a percentage of GDP, as well as its components, rose steadily 
for much of the 1980-2015 period. Starting at a relatively modest 147 percent of GDP in 
1980, 36 years later total nonfinancial debt had reached 304 per cent of GDP in euro-area 
countries and, of this percentage, only one third corresponds to the public sector. In 2015 
about two-thirds of total euro-area countries’ nonfinancial debt has its origin in the private 
sector (both households and companies). However, while the unprecedented increase in 
public debt across EMU countries has raised serious concerns among economists about 
both its sustainability and its impact on economic growth, they have taken a more nuanced 
position regarding the risks of private debt accumulation, despite its magnitude. 
Nevertheless, all forms of nonfinancial debt should be sources of concern when they are 
high and register an upward trend.  
This paper aimed to fill the existing gap in the literature by assessing the effect of all forms 
of nonfinancial debt (households, nonfinancial corporations and governments) on 
economic growth in euro-area countries. To do so, we used a methodology that explicitly 
takes into account the possible heterogeneity (see, e.g., Erberhart and Presbitero, 2015 or 
Chudick et al., 2017) in the relationship between each source of nonfinancial debt and 
growth across euro-area countries. In particular, our analytical strategy has rested on the 
estimation of an equation based on the empirical growth literature augmented by debt to 
assess whether the latter has an impact on growth over and above other determinants. So, 
after ensuring that all the variables in the model have the same order of integration, and to 
provide a broad view of the debt-growth nexus, we successively estimated three models (a 
baseline, an asymmetric and a threshold model) for each of the ten countries in our sample 
and, following Cecchetti et al. (2011), we treated the different types of borrowers – 
households, corporations and governments – separately. 
Summing up, the results from both the baseline and the asymmetric model suggest that 
although the effects on nonfinancial debt accumulation clearly differ across countries, on 
average the highest marginal impact of a debt rise corresponds to the household and public 
sector. Furthermore, an increase in private debt is more harmful in peripheral than in 
central EMU countries, while the average effect of a rise in public debt does not differ 
between these two groups of countries. Focusing on the effects of a debt increase beyond 
the turning point estimated in the threshold model, it is noticeable that above the estimated 
threshold, on average the negative effect of an increase in public debt on growth is similar 
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to the one found using the baseline or the asymmetric model. However, the average 
negative reaction to an increase in private debt is higher above the detected tipping point in 
the threshold model than in the two previous ones. As a result, in the threshold model the 
highest marginal impact of a debt increase beyond the turning point corresponds to the 
household sector. 
Our results also suggest that there exists an asymmetric effect for the household and 
government sectors. However, while in the households’ sector the positive effect of a debt 
reduction on growth is higher than the negative effects of a debt increase, in the public 
sector the negative effect of a debt increase on growth is higher than the positive impact of 
a debt reduction. Furthermore, our findings indicate that while a reduction in nonfinancial 
corporations’ or governments’ debt has a negligible effect on growth, the response is 
relevant in the case of households. Nevertheless, the significant positive reaction of 
households’ debt deleverage clearly differs across countries, the average impact being 
higher in peripheral countries (especially in Spain) than in their central counterparts.   
Finally, it is noticeable that the highest thresholds are found for corporate debt (87%), 
followed by public debt (59%) and household debt (39%). Focusing on the private sector, 
not only are debt thresholds lower for households rather than for firms, but also, beyond 
the detected tipping point, the average marginal effect of a household debt increase on 
growth is higher than that of companies’ debt. Moreover, in the two private sectors, 
thresholds are lower in peripheral than in central EMU countries and the marginal impact 
above them is very high in some of these peripheral economies. Conversely, in the public 
sector we find lower thresholds in central than in peripheral countries.  
Therefore, our findings seem to suggest that EMU central countries are more tolerant of a 
private debt increase than peripheral economies, and that the negative potential effect is 
higher in peripheral Member States than in core countries. Yet, although the warning signs 
of increased private leverage in the run-up to the crisis of 2008 were largely ignored 
(especially in peripheral countries), euro-area economies should now be aware of the 
adverse consequences of private debt accumulation (in particular, in the household sector) 
and should be as concerned by private sector leveraging as they are by public debt.  
Our results have significant policy implications. Empirical evidence on the impact of 
nonfinancial debt on economic growth helps to inform policy and stresses the importance 
of monitoring both private and public debt to stimulate economic growth. Additionally, the 
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heterogeneous relationships detected in the debt-growth nexus suggest that the pace of 
leveraging should be adapted to the differences in debt tolerance and impact in each EMU 
country; therefore, rigid and uniform criteria are not advisable when addressing the 
necessary adjustments.  
Our contribution also provides guidance for theoretical models that seek to study the 
consequences of debt on economic growth. We show that private debt matters as well as 
public debt. Thus, the growing macroeconomic literature should focus more closely on 
private indebtedness when studying the capacity of an economy to produce goods and 
services over time in order to increase the validity and viability of these models and their 
ability to offer a systematic structural interpretation of economic reality. 
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            Appendix 1: Definition of the explanatory variables and data sources 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Description Source 
Real growth rate (gt) Growth rate of real per capita GDP (annual %)  World Development Indicators (World Bank) 
Level of Output (yt) Per capita Gross domestic product at 2010 market prices AMECO, extended to 2015 using International 
Monetary Fund (2016b) 
Household debt-to-GDP ratio (hdt) Household and non-profit institutions serving households debt 
(all liabilities) as percentage of GDP 
Cecchetti et al. (2011) extended to 2015 using AMECO 
http://www.bis.org/publ/work352_data.xls  
Nonfinancial corporate debt-to-
GDP ratio (cdt) 
Nonfinancial corporate debt (all liabilities less shares and other 
equity) as percentage of GDP 
Cecchetti et al. (2011) extended to 2015 using AMECO 
http://www.bis.org/publ/work352_data.xls 
Public debt-to-GDP ratio (pdt) Ratio of public debt to GDP AMECO and International Monetary Fund (2016b) 
Population growth (POPGRt) Population growth (annual %) World Development Indicators (World Bank) 
 
GS-to-GDP ratio (GSt) Ratio of gross savings to GDP (%) World Development Indicators (World Bank) 
Human capital (HKt) Life expectancy at birth, total (years) World Development Indicators (World Bank) 
Openess (OPENt) Absolute sum of exports and imports over GDP World Development Indicators (World Bank)  
Inflation (INFt) Inflation as measured by the consumer price index  
 (annual %) 
World Development Indicators (World Bank),   
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Figure 2. Private debt-to-GDP by sector in EMU countries: 1980-2015 
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Red lines correspond to the average values. 
 
Table 1a. EMU central countries sectoral debt as a percentage of GDP 
     Levels         Changes     
AUSTRIA 1980 1990 1999 2009 2012 2015 1980-1990 1990-1999 1999-2009 2009-2012 2012-2015 
Households  38.8 38.6 42.1 53.1 55.4 56.2 -0.4% 9.1% 26.0% 4.3% 1.4% 
Nonfinancial corporations  82.2 73.9 70.2 92.4 95.0 95.9 -10.1% -5.0% 31.7% 2.8% 0.9% 
General Government  35.7 59.1 75.4 75.8 78.8 82.1 65.6% 27.5% 0.6% 3.9% 4.2% 
BELGIUM 1980 1990 1999 2009 2012 2015 1980-1990 1990-1999 1999-2009 2009-2012 2012-2015 
Households  30.9 33.2 35.5 49.1 48.4 48.8 7.5% 6.9% 38.5% -1.4% 0.8% 
Nonfinancial corporations  64.8 75.3 100.4 165.4 174.6 179.8 16.3% 33.3% 64.7% 5.6% 3.0% 
General Government  61.5 140.5 126.8 93.9 99.3 100.0 128.5% -9.7% -25.9% 5.8% 0.7% 
FINLAND 1980 1990 1999 2009 2012 2015 1980-1990 1990-1999 1999-2009 2009-2012 2012-2015 
Households  28.5 47.2 33.1 64.5 68.9 73.3 65.2% -29.8% 94.8% 6.9% 6.4% 
Nonfinancial corporations  97.8 99.3 106.5 139.1 142.4 148.5 1.6% 7.2% 30.6% 2.4% 4.3% 
General Government  16.3 22.8 76.5 40.0 52.3 60.8 40.5% 234.9% -47.7% 30.9% 16.3% 
FRANCE 1980 1990 1999 2009 2012 2015 1980-1990 1990-1999 1999-2009 2009-2012 2012-2015 
Households  26.7 44.7 44.9 67.1 66.4 63.1 67.5% 0.5% 49.4% -1.0% -5.0% 
Nonfinancial corporations  96.9 103.4 110.7 149.4 153.3 151.7 6.7% 7.0% 35.0% 2.7% -1.0% 
General Government  34.1 45.8 74.3 76.6 87.3 93.2 34.6% 62.2% 3.0% 14.0% 6.8% 
GERMANY 1980 1990 1999 2009 2012 2015 1980-1990 1990-1999 1999-2009 2009-2012 2012-2015 
Households  56.3 59.0 69.6 64.3 67.3 65.8 4.73% 18.05% -7.54% 4.55% -2.25% 
Nonfinancial corporations  44.6 34.2 77.5 100.8 103.3 104.9 -23.32% 126.58% 30.16% 2.49% 1.54% 
General Government  31.2 41.6 62.3 70.6 79.2 69.5 33.38% 49.50% 13.34% 12.21% -12.17% 
NETHERLANDS 1980 1990 1999 2009 2012 2015 1980-1990 1990-1999 1999-2009 2009-2012 2012-2015 
Households  41.0 45.7 74.7 126.8 119.7 128.2 11.6% 63.3% 69.7% -5.6% 7.1% 
Nonfinancial corporations  93.6 112.2 118.1 117.5 128.5 127.9 19.8% 5.3% -0.5% 9.3% -0.5% 
General Government  64.6 97.3 74.2 55.4 64.3 62.8 50.7% -23.7% -25.4% 16.1% -2.4% 
Table 1b. EMU peripheral countries sectoral debt as a percentage of GDP 
     Levels         Changes     
GREECE 1980 1990 1999 2009 2012 2015 1980-1990 1990-1999 1999-2009 2009-2012 2012-2015 
Households  7.8 8.7 16.1 52.1 50.5 47.3 11.6% 84.9% 222.6% -2.9% -6.5% 
Nonfinancial corporations  60.2 46.7 44.7 65.5 65.8 62.0 -22.5% -4.2% 46.5% 0.4% -5.8% 
General Government  25.5 82.9 111.6 120.1 159.2 173.8 224.7% 34.7% 7.6% 32.6% 9.2% 
ITALY 1980 1990 1999 2009 2012 2015 1980-1990 1990-1999 1999-2009 2009-2012 2012-2015 
Households  6.3 20.5 27.2 50.5 50.5 51.3 224.8% 32.3% 86.0% 0.0% 1.6% 
Nonfinancial corporations  47.4 63.7 92.2 124.6 121.9 128.0 34.2% 44.8% 35.1% -2.1% 5.0% 
General Government  54.0 92.8 130.4 105.9 118.2 125.7 72.0% 40.4% -18.8% 11.6% 6.3% 
PORTUGAL 1980 1990 1999 2009 2012 2015 1980-1990 1990-1999 1999-2009 2009-2012 2012-2015 
Households  15.4 21.8 63.8 98.1 102.6 99.0 41.7% 193.1% 53.8% 4.5% -3.4% 
Nonfinancial corporations  94.3 48.7 99.2 142.5 143.2 146.7 -48.4% 103.7% 43.7% 0.4% 2.5% 
General Government  35.8 68.4 62.7 80.0 124.7 128.2 91.3% -8.3% 27.5% 55.9% 2.8% 
SPAIN 1980 1990 1999 2009 2012 2015 1980-1990 1990-1999 1999-2009 2009-2012 2012-2015 
Households  24.1 39.7 48.5 85.7 95.0 88.3 64.5% 22.2% 76.7% 10.9% -7.1% 
Nonfinancial corporations  118.5 93.2 103.8 189.7 185.2 182.6 -21.4% 11.5% 82.7% -2.4% -1.4% 
General Government  27.5 49.0 74.3 50.6 83.9 95.3 78.1% 51.8% -31.9% 65.9% 13.6% 
Source: Cecchetti et al. (2011) extended to 2015 using AMECO; http://www.bis.org/publ/work352_data.xls 
 
 
Table 2a. Baseline empirical model. Central countries 
Panel A: Estimation results       
 
AT BE FI FR  GE   NL  
hd cd pd hd cd pd hd cd pd hd cd pd hd cd pd hd cd pd 
gt-1 
 
INFt 
 
ΔHKt 
 
ΔOPENt 
 
POPGROt 
 
GSt 
 
Δdt 
 
0.3738 
(2.7455) 
-0.1081 
(-3.1421) 
0.0420 
(2.6325) 
0.2346 
(4.3356) 
0.0718 
(2.8345) 
0.0541 
(2.7691) 
-0.2487 
(-2.9506) 
0.4390 
(3.4691) 
-0.1472 
(-3.1321) 
1.0005 
(2.8281) 
0.2832 
(5.5322) 
0.3350 
(2.7299) 
0.0670 
(2.8477) 
-0.1880 
(-3.1881) 
0.3825 
(2.9431) 
-0.0803 
(-2.9393) 
0.2335 
(2.8713) 
0.2128 
(3.1009) 
0.0112 
(2.9144) 
0.0457 
(2.8635) 
-0.0023 
(-2.8425) 
0.0758 
(2.9536) 
-0.2507 
(-2.8713) 
1.7608 
(2.8764) 
0.1292 
(4.7738) 
1.990 
(2.7953) 
0.1051 
(3.4975) 
-0.0463 
(-2.9636) 
0.1168 
(2.9368) 
-0.2676 
(-3.1538) 
1.5789 
(2.8581) 
0.1373 
(4.9634) 
1.8297 
(2.7613) 
0.1087 
(3.6877) 
-0.0381 
(-2.9102) 
0.0597 
(2.7498) 
-0.0559 
(-2.9565) 
1.9230 
(2.8369) 
0.0925 
(4.1412) 
1.5474 
(2.9185) 
0.0826 
(3.2412) 
-0.1116 
(-2.8738) 
0.0171 
(2.9744) 
-0.2528 
(-2.8492) 
1.0024 
(2.8759) 
0.2616 
(3.2038) 
13.0941 
(3.2038) 
0.2712 
(4.8230) 
-0.3332 
(-2.9411) 
0.0376 
(3.2888) 
-0.2941 
(-2.9429) 
1.0714 
(2.7942) 
0.4124 
(3.2587) 
10.8246 
(3.0170) 
0.2233 
(4.1510) 
-0.1106 
(-2.9870) 
0.3010 
(2.9865) 
-0.2053 
(-2.9846) 
0.2321 
(2.9166) 
0.2762 
(3.3701) 
4.8721 
(2.7637) 
0.1804 
(4.1991) 
-0.4605 
(-2.9791) 
0.4555 
(2.9320) 
-0.0040 
(-2.8654) 
1.6952 
(2.7952) 
0.2255 
(3.0763) 
1.4546 
(2.8461) 
0.0096 
(2.9401) 
-0.0930 
(-2.9394) 
0.4886 
(3.3858) 
-0.0335 
(-2.8915) 
1.5914 
(2.8629) 
0.2831 
(3.7864) 
1.8213 
(2.8325) 
0.0126 
(2.8811) 
-0.1209 
(-2.9864) 
0.1457 
(2.9316) 
-0.0029 
(-2.7982) 
0.8473 
(2.9903) 
0.1514 
(3.1191) 
0.4563 
(2.8311) 
0.0753 
(2.9437) 
-0.2839 
(-2.9559) 
0.1694 
(3.1397) 
-0.2054 
(-2.9596) 
1.8120 
(2.8708) 
0.3976 
(5.8877) 
0.8033 
(2.8701) 
0.0005 
(2.9215) 
-0.2857 
(-2.9670) 
0.2811 
(3.1121) 
-0.1510 
(-2.9126) 
1.5990 
(2.9422) 
0.4254 
(5.5711) 
1.0290 
(2.9256) 
0.0050 
(2.9211) 
-0.0028 
(-2.8697) 
0.1596 
(2.9443) 
-0.1951 
(-2.9772) 
1.3715 
(2.8306) 
0.3925 
(5.3482) 
0.9958 
(2.9860) 
0.0110 
(2.8454) 
-0.1565 
(-2.9738) 
 
0.5363 
(3.7445) 
-0.4289 
(-2.9385) 
0.5682 
(2.8409) 
0.1266 
(3.1494) 
0.9221 
(2.9549) 
0.0460 
(3.3748) 
-0.0301 
(-2.9583) 
 
 
0.5509 
(3.8854) 
-0.4152 
(-3.1020) 
0.3034 
(2.9219) 
0.1152 
(2.9384) 
0.7040 
(2.7812) 
0.0490 
(2.9466) 
-0.0677 
(-2.9786) 
 
 
0.4737 
(3.3240) 
-0.3693 
(-2.9176) 
0.7281 
(2.9562) 
0.1126 
(2.9783) 
0.6100 
(2.7723) 
0.0586 
(2.8070) 
-0.1084 
(-2.8638) 
 
Panel B: Model Diagnostics 
      
Adjusted R2 
DW Test 
χ2N  
 
χ2SC 
 
χ2H 
 
0.6054 
2.1267 
0.3646 
[0.8334] 
0.6832 
[0.5138] 
11.4297 
[0.1209] 
0.6247 
2.1809 
0.3913  
[0.8223] 
0.7820  
[0.4680] 
5.7638  
[0.5676] 
0.5565 
2.1792 
0.3634 
[0.8338] 
0.5616 
[0.5771] 
11.3543 
[0.1239] 
0.6154 
2.2069 
0.7268 
[0.6953] 
1.5286 
[0.2357] 
3.9147 
[0.7896] 
0.6247 
2.1715 
0.3995  
[0.8190] 
2.1435 
[0.1375] 
4.1806  
[0.7588] 
0.6507 
2.1661 
0.8038 
[0.6690] 
1.0074 
[0.3801] 
5.6342 
[0.5831] 
0.6335 
2.2949 
2.2910  
[0.5244] 
0.6935  
[0.7070] 
5.8134  
[0.5617] 
0.6953 
2.2082 
0.4366  
[0.8034] 
0.8074  
[0.4569] 
3.1477 
[0.8710] 
0.7575 
2.2488 
2.5958  
[0.2731] 
0.6065  
[0.5561] 
1.5026 
[0.9822] 
 
 
0.5828 
2.1181 
1.0438  
[0.5934] 
1.3346  
[0.2807] 
6.3093  
[0.5041] 
 
 
0.5404 
2.1911 
2.6440  
[0.2671] 
0.9962  
[0.3829] 
4.2422  
[0.7515] 
 
 
0.5618 
2.2147 
1.6846  
[0.4307] 
2.0913  
[0.1438] 
1.2822  
[0.9889] 
 
 
0.6574 
2.2893 
0.5578  
[0.7566] 
0.40403  
[0.7824] 
6.3893  
[0.4973] 
 
 
0.6099 
2.2847 
0.9015 
[0.6372] 
1.2670  
[0.2985] 
4.1034  
[0.7678] 
 
 
0.6327 
2.2231 
1.4372 
[0.4874] 
1.2341  
[0.3089] 
5.3348  
[0.6192] 
 
 
0.5808 
2.2156 
1.1960  
[0.5499] 
0.8292  
[0.4476] 
3.8458  
[0.7974] 
 
 
0.5926 
2.1636 
1.3359  
[0.5312] 
0.6592  
[0.5257] 
8.5920  
[0.2833] 
 
 
0.5968 
2.2076 
1.1500  
[0.5627] 
0.3355  
[0.7189] 
11.5745  
[0.1154] 
Notes: AT, BE, FI, FR, GE and NL stand for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands respectively, while hd, cd and pd stand for household, corporate and public debt 
respectively. 
  In the ordinary brackets below the parameter estimates, the corresponding t-statistics are shown, based on the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors proposed by 
Newey and West (1987). 
 χ2N, χ2SC and χ2H are the Jarque-Bera test for normality, the Breusch-Godfrey LM test for second-order serial correlation and the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test for heteroskedasticity. The 
associated probability values are given in square brackets. 
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Table 2b. Baseline empirical model. Peripheral countries.  
Panel A: Estimation results    
 
GR IT PT  SP  
hd cd pd hd cd pd hd cd pd hd cd pd 
gt-1 
 
INFt 
 
ΔHKt 
 
ΔOPENt 
 
POPGROt 
 
GSt 
 
Δdt 
 
0.6952 
(3.9309) 
-0.3243 
(-2.9755) 
0.5144 
(2.7254) 
0.0137 
(2.7124) 
1.7489 
(2.9646) 
0.1952 
(3.1206) 
-0.5350 
(-2.9417) 
0.6638 
(4.1203) 
-0.2594 
(-2.8716) 
0.6712 
(2.7652) 
0.0625 
(2.7536) 
1.1643 
(2.6804) 
0.1448 
(2.6441) 
-0.3390 
(-2.8192) 
0.4374 
(2.9916) 
-0.2198 
(-2.7857) 
0.4085 
(2.8206) 
0.0114 
(2.7110) 
1.8628 
(2.7968) 
0.1434 
(2.8193) 
-0.1434 
(-2.8576) 
0.2579 
(2.8508) 
-0.0011 
(-2.8693) 
1.1121 
(2.9447) 
0.2369 
(2.7934) 
2.3133 
(2.7567) 
0.0430 
(2.7352) 
-0.1768 
(-2.8635) 
0.2969 
(2.9651) 
-0.0105 
(2.9160) 
1.1180 
(2.9433) 
0.2395 
(2.8679) 
2.1702 
(2.8721) 
0.0451 
(2.7419) 
-0.0767 
(-2.9115) 
0.1781 
(2.9111) 
-0.0471 
(-2.8709) 
1.2429 
(2.8123) 
0.1891 
(2.8270) 
2.0588 
(2.8929) 
0.0545 
(2.8175) 
-0.1502 
(-2.8552) 
 
0.4654 
(2.9918) 
-0.1321 
(-2.8727) 
0.9624 
(2.8303) 
0.1428 
(2.7510) 
1.4095 
(2.9681) 
0.1306 
(2.9616) 
-0.2175 
(-2.9244) 
 
 
0.5313 
(3.4383) 
-0.1062 
(-2.7673) 
0.9480 
(2.8171) 
0.1463 
(2.7542) 
0.5896 
(2.8535) 
0.0980 
(2.9185) 
-0.1593 
(-2.9221) 
 
 
0.2934 
(2.9513) 
-0.0528 
(-2.8067) 
0.0836 
(2.7761) 
0.1210 
(2.7586) 
0.0080 
(2.7622) 
0.1167 
(3.3047) 
-0.2279 
(-3.1441) 
 
 
0.7765 
(3.1404) 
-0.0481 
(-2.9797) 
0.7728 
(2.7630) 
0.2294 
(2.7387) 
0.3932 
(2.7684) 
0.0436 
(2.8451) 
-0.1444 
(-2.9745) 
 
 
0.8557 
(3.3086) 
-0.0767 
(-2.9282) 
0.5498 
(2.8453) 
0.2754 
(2.7215) 
0.1454 
(2.8304) 
0.0371 
(2.7623) 
-0.1826 
(-2.8794) 
 
 
0.4335 
(2.9349) 
-0.0219 
(-2.8386) 
1.1984 
(2.8201) 
0.1218 
(2.7513) 
0.7608 
(2.8312) 
0.1205 
(2.7473) 
-0.2050 
(-2.7208) 
 
Panel B: Model Diagnostics 
   
Adjusted R2 
DW Test 
χ2N  
 
χ2SC 
 
χ2H 
 
0.5700 
2.2119 
0.7694  
[0.6809] 
0.3660  
[0.6970] 
3.8231  
[0.7999] 
0.6180 
2.1480 
0.1594  
[0.9234] 
0.7903  
[0.4643] 
4.8579  
[0.6773] 
0.6321 
2.1987 
0.4905  
[0.7825] 
0.7345  
[0.4894] 
7.6662 
[0.3629] 
0.5939 
2.3144 
0.2095  
[0.9006] 
1.9360  
[0.1645] 
6.6320  
[0.4682] 
0.6028 
2.2578 
0.3395  
[0.8438] 
3.2863  
[0.2212] 
6.0811  
[0.5303] 
0.6134 
2.3077 
0.1880  
[0.9131] 
1.4282   
[0.2594] 
6.4324  
[0.4903] 
0.5928 
2.2578 
0.3395  
[0.8438] 
3.2863  
[0.2212] 
6.0811  
[0.5303] 
0.6289 
2.2229 
0.7712  
[0.6801] 
0.1957  
[0.8235] 
3.8070  
[0.8017] 
0.6377 
2.2791 
0.3485  
[0.8401] 
0.9953  
[0.3833] 
6.9531  
[0.4338] 
 
 
0.6293 
2.1571 
1.7129  
[0.4249] 
1.0187  
[0.3750] 
9.6066  
[0.2120] 
 
 
0.6365 
2.1446 
0.7618  
[0.6833] 
1.2034  
[0.3163] 
7.1328 
[0.4152] 
 
 
0.6979 
2.2499 
1.7816  
[0.4144] 
2.3961  
[0.1109] 
9.3144 
[0.2309] 
Notes:      GR, IT, PT and SP stand Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain respectively, while hd, cd and pd stand for household, corporate and public debt respectively. 
 In the ordinary brackets below the parameter estimates, the corresponding t-statistics are shown, based on the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors 
 In the ordinary brackets below the parameter estimates, the corresponding t-statistics are shown, based on the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors proposed by 
Newey and West (1987). 
 χ2N, χ2SC and χ2H are the Jarque-Bera test for normality, the Breusch-Godfrey LM test for second-order serial correlation and the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test for heteroskedasticity. The 
associated probability values are given in square brackets. 
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Table 3a. Asymmetric model. Central countries 
Panel A: Estimation results       
 
AT BE FI FR  GE   NL  
hd cd pd hd cd pd hd cd pd hd cd pd hd cd pd hd cd pd 
 
 
gt-1 
 
INFt 
 
ΔHKt 
 
ΔOPENt 
 
POPGROt 
 
GSt 
 
ΔdtI(ΔdtI>0) 
 
ΔdtI(ΔdtI<0) 
 
 
0.3657 
(2.9490) 
-0.1129 
(-2.7564) 
0.0249 
(2.8883) 
0.2370 
(4.2480) 
0.0586 
(2.8163) 
0.0563 
(2.7303) 
-0.4313 
(-2.9481) 
-0.2222 
(-2.8372) 
0.4021 
(2.8320) 
-0.1749 
(-3.3050) 
0.9138 
(2.8515) 
0.2905 
(4.1407) 
0.2698 
(2.8423) 
0.0602 
(2.7432) 
-0.1025 
(-2.8574) 
-0.0577 
(-2.9824) 
0.3816 
(2.8808) 
-0.0832 
(-2.8521) 
0.2830 
(2.9659) 
0.2094 
(4.1428) 
0.0508 
(2.8598) 
0.0481 
(2.9130) 
-0.0207 
(-2.9107) 
-0.0362 
(-2.8111) 
0.0798 
(2.9606) 
-0.2622 
(-2.8887) 
1.7427 
(2.8282) 
0.1263 
(3.5361) 
1.9072 
(2.9628) 
0.1046 
(4.4203) 
-0.0859 
(-2.9808) 
-0.0545 
(-2.8248) 
0.1125 
(2.8786) 
-0.2688 
(-3.1129) 
1.5681 
(2.8927) 
0.1370 
(3.3407) 
1.8289 
(2.8571) 
0.1095 
(4.6189) 
-0.0835 
(-2.9022) 
-0.0501 
(-2.8581) 
0.0797 
(2.8711) 
-0.0731 
(-2.7508) 
2.0416 
(2.7687) 
0.0798 
(2.8043) 
2.0102 
(2.9043) 
0.1073 
(4.0988) 
-0.2812 
(-2.9342) 
-0.1272 
(-2.8114) 
0.0123 
(2.9758) 
-0.2736 
(-2.8753) 
1.0187 
(2.7954) 
0.2592 
(3.1049) 
13.3649 
(3.8480) 
0.2679 
(4.5984) 
-0.2821 
(-2.9440) 
-0.4203 
(-2.8666) 
0.0640 
(2.8652) 
-0.2725 
(-2.9319) 
0.8453 
(2.8230) 
0.4393 
(4.2010) 
9.9146 
(3.5380) 
0.2232 
(4.3908) 
-0.2843 
(-3.5385) 
-0.1168 
(-2.9214) 
0.3064 
(2.9479) 
-0.2136 
(-2.8671) 
0.1954 
(2.8136) 
0.2733 
(4.1131) 
4.9146 
(2.7617) 
0.1786 
(3.9671) 
-0.4551 
(-3.4399) 
-0.4298 
(-2.9103) 
0.4595 
(3.2191) 
-0.0011 
(-2.9168) 
1.6862 
(2.7948) 
0.2569 
(3.0501) 
1.3537 
(2.9017) 
0.0118 
(2.8753) 
-0.0448 
(-2.9695) 
-0.1304 
(-2.9077) 
0.4925 
(3.3180) 
-0.0279 
(-2.9490) 
1.6824 
(2.8608) 
0.2869 
(3.7587) 
1.6559 
(2.8811) 
0.0157 
(2.8413) 
-0.0891 
(-2.9471) 
-0.1945 
(-2.8404) 
0.1418 
(2.9150) 
-0.0228 
(-2.8448) 
1.1022 
(2.8332) 
0.1643 
(2.7756) 
0.9861 
(2.8522) 
0.0732 
(2.9790) 
-0.3447 
(-3.0785) 
-0.0985 
(-2.9057) 
 
0.1679 
(3.1979) 
-0.2029 
(-2.9464) 
1.8118 
(2.8499) 
0.3957 
(5.5781) 
0.7954 
(2.8617) 
0.0024 
(2.9148) 
-0.0832 
(-2.9225) 
-0.0516 
(-2.8766) 
 
 
0.2163 
(2.9536) 
-0.1306 
(-2.8881) 
1.8302 
(2.8554) 
0.4000 
(5.1659) 
0.8660 
(2.8606) 
0.0099 
(2.8916) 
-0.0503 
(-2.9150) 
-0.1067 
(-2.9253) 
 
 
0.1602 
(2.9114) 
-0.1963 
(-2.9298) 
1.3782 
(2.8755) 
0.3928 
(5.2092) 
0.9966 
(2.8490) 
0.0104 
(2.9307) 
-0.1537 
(-2.8596) 
-0.0471 
(-2.8609) 
 
 
0.4459 
(3.6746) 
-0.4915 
(-3.2724) 
1.8799 
(2.8559) 
0.1584 
(4.5974) 
0.2058 
(2.8463) 
0.1018 
(3.2200) 
-0.0412 
(-2.9726) 
-0.0521 
(-3.6277) 
 
 
0.5417 
(3.7397) 
-0.4246 
(-2.9111) 
0.3647 
(2.8585) 
0.1194 
(2.8403) 
0.9105 
(2.7752) 
0.0408 
(2.8749) 
-0.0419 
(-2.8362) 
-0.0371 
(-2.8378) 
 
 
0.4607 
(2.9083) 
-0.3775 
(-2.9265) 
0.7315 
(2.8555) 
0.1106 
(2.8568) 
0.6852 
(2.7641) 
0.0567 
(2.8662) 
-0.0459 
(-2.9155) 
-0.0220 
(-2.8683) 
 
Panel B: Model Diagnostics 
      
Adjusted R2 
DW Test 
χ2N  
 
χ2SC 
 
χ2H 
 
0.6446 
2.3823 
2.4205  
[0.2908] 
0.2994  
[0.7439] 
9.3411  
[0.2366] 
 
0.6486 
2.2169 
0.3067 
[0.8578] 
0.8219  
[0.4511] 
10.7826  
[0.2143] 
 
0.6597 
2.1792 
0.3595 
[0.8355] 
0.5716  
[0.5719] 
10.5837  
[0.2264] 
 
0.5807 
2.3471 
2.6114 
[0.2663] 
0.6508 
[0.5852] 
4.8270  
[0.7759] 
 
0.5930 
2.2247 
2.5000 
[0.2864] 
0.6783 
[0.5811] 
5.3436  
[0.7203] 
 
0.6256 
2.1669 
0.1005 
[0.9948] 
1.5696 
[0.2279] 
5.3384  
[0.7209] 
 
0.6760 
2.3435 
1.2791  
[05275] 
0.6458  
[0.6557] 
5.7081  
[0.6799] 
 
0.7009 
2.2827 
0.0517  
[0.9745] 
0.7515  
[0.4775] 
3.1780  
[0.9227] 
 
0.7452 
2.2405 
2.5186  
[0.2639] 
1.0305  
[0.3759] 
1.4742  
[0.9931] 
 
0.6248 
2.2702 
0.9232  
[0.6393] 
0.9862  
[0.3867] 
6.4897  
[0.5926] 
 
0.6353 
2.2114 
2.9845  
[0.2248] 
0.7671 
[0.4750] 
4.9780  
[0.7599] 
 
0.6455 
2.2114 
2.3810  
[0.3041] 
1.2462 
[0.3049] 
2.3561  
[0.9681] 
 
0.6747 
2.4112 
0.5704  
[0.7519] 
0.6531  
[0.6209] 
6.0860  
[0.6376] 
 
0.6524 
2.2875 
0.7583  
[0.6845] 
0.0075  
[0.9926] 
3.9572  
[0.8610] 
 
0.6633 
2.2636 
1.4306  
[0.4890] 
1.2583  
[0.3047] 
4.9919  
[0.7584] 
 
0.6272 
2.2143 
1.5059  
[0.4710] 
0.1453  
[0.8654] 
11.0725  
[0.1976] 
 
0.6242 
2.2186 
1.7202  
[0.5149] 
1.3659  
[0.2735] 
8.7312  
[0.3655] 
 
0.6470 
2.2155 
1.8202  
[0.5011] 
0.3256  
[0.7251] 
12.6654  
[0.1239] 
Notes: AT, BE, FI, FR, GE and NL stand for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands respectively; while hd, cd and pd stand for household, corporate and public debt 
respectively. 
 In the ordinary brackets below the parameter estimates, the corresponding t-statistics are shown, based on the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors proposed by 
Newey and West (1987).  
χ2N, χ2SC and χ2H are the Jarque-Bera test for normality, the Breusch-Godfrey LM test for second-order serial correlation and the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test for heteroskedasticity.  
The associated probability values are given in square brackets. 
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                Table 3b. Asymmetric model. Peripheral countries.  
Panel A: Estimation results    
 
GR IT PT  SP  
hd cd pd hd cd pd hd cd pd hd cd pd 
 
gt-1 
 
INFt 
 
ΔHKt 
 
ΔOPENt 
 
POPGROt 
 
GSt 
 
ΔdtI(ΔdtI>0) 
 
ΔdtI(ΔdtI<0) 
 
 
 
0.5992 
(2.9723) 
-0.3849 
(-3.1451) 
0.3057 
(2.7545) 
0.0108 
(2.7099) 
1.4382 
(2.8082) 
0.2585 
(3.1210) 
-0.5137 
(-2.8232) 
-0.4800 
(-2.7953) 
 
 
0.6534 
(2.9536) 
-0.2755 
(-2.7661) 
0.1226 
(2.8327) 
0.1139 
(2.9499) 
1.6757 
(2.9766) 
0.1714 
(2.8916) 
-0.3900 
(-2.9150) 
-0.0033 
(-2.8117) 
 
 
0.1392 
(2.9325) 
-0.3450 
(-2.9123) 
0.1514 
(2.8514) 
0.0120 
(2.7406) 
1.8957 
(2.8381) 
0.2795 
(2.9548) 
-0.2763 
(-2.9596) 
-0.0526 
(-2.8463) 
 
 
0.2557 
(2.8257) 
-0.0104 
(-2.7827) 
0.7764 
(2.7573) 
0.2613 
(3.5372) 
2.3696 
(2.7549) 
0.0642 
(2.7266) 
-0.2561 
(-2.9234) 
-0.1878 
(-3.2643) 
 
 
0.2899 
(2.8777) 
-0.0158 
(-2.8912) 
1.5046 
(2.7722) 
0.2313 
(2.8518) 
2.2084 
(2.8053) 
0.0366 
(2.9189) 
-0.1737 
(-2.8325) 
-0.0751 
(-2.8960) 
 
 
0.1323 
(2.8218) 
-0.0346 
(-2.7526) 
0.9579 
(2.8658) 
0.1879 
(2.9468) 
2.2395 
(2.8313) 
0.0873 
(2.8239) 
-0.2400 
(-2.9501) 
-0.1760 
(-2.8649) 
 
 
0.4766 
(3.0387) 
-0.1370 
(-2.9267) 
1.0638 
(2.9088) 
0.1517 
(2.7659) 
1.2213 
(2.8256) 
0.1462 
(2.7403) 
-0.2666 
(-2.9443) 
-0.4112 
(-2.8545) 
 
 
0.5790 
(2.9794) 
-0.1109 
(-2.9698) 
0.8110 
(2.7454) 
0.1628 
(2.8269) 
0.6516 
(2.7632) 
0.0577 
(2.8405) 
-0.0870 
(-2.7413) 
-0.0706 
(-2.8561) 
 
 
0.3119 
(2.9110) 
-0.0674 
(-2.7836) 
0.2826 
(2.7427) 
0.1237 
(2.8510) 
0.0031 
(2.7428) 
0.1376 
(3.8611) 
-0.2828 
(-3.5280) 
-0.1343 
(-2.8546) 
 
 
0.8802 
(3.0305) 
-0.0114 
(-2.9152) 
0.7905 
(2.7667) 
0.1974 
(2.8723) 
0.3964 
(2.7170) 
0.0050 
(2.8124) 
-0.1924 
(-2.9296) 
-0.7396 
(-2.8585) 
 
 
0.8926 
(3.0503) 
-0.1419 
(-2.9268) 
0.9224 
(2.8269) 
0.2847 
(3.0860) 
0.1359 
(2.8776) 
0.0191 
(2.7189) 
-0.0981 
(-2.7754) 
-0.0728 
(-2.9720) 
 
 
0.4381 
(2.8850) 
-0.0285 
(-2.8435) 
1.2093 
(2.9189) 
0.1221 
(2.7902) 
0.7131 
(2.8489) 
0.1240 
(3.3650) 
-0.1129 
(-3.1691) 
-0.0376 
(-2.9599) 
 
Panel B: Model Diagnostics 
   
Adjusted R2 
DW Test 
χ2N  
 
χ2SC 
 
χ2H 
 
0.5824 
2.3108 
0.7340  
[0.6928] 
0.3257  
[0.7251] 
4.5151  
[0.8070] 
 
0.6550 
2.2684 
0.1803  
[0.9138] 
0.5302  
[0.7203] 
4.9322  
[0.7648] 
 
0.7370 
2.2910 
1.3648  
[0.5054] 
1.6182  
[0.2183] 
0.6884  
[0.9996] 
 
0.6628 
2.2083 
0.2160  
[0.8976] 
1.7222  
[0.1992] 
6.7924  
[0.5592] 
 
0.6021 
2.2837 
0.9752  
[0.6138] 
1.6267  
[0.2167] 
5.9522  
[0.6526] 
 
0.6201 
2.3025 
0.5109  
[0.7746] 
1.0837  
[0.3550] 
4.4272  
[0.8167] 
 
0.6121 
2.2117 
0.5135  
[0.7736] 
0.4286  
[0.6561] 
5.0263  
[0.7548] 
 
0.6543 
2.1382 
1.4850  
[0.4759] 
0.3776  
[0.8312] 
4.2221  
[0.8365] 
 
0.6647 
2.1709 
2.4805  
[0.2893] 
0.5417  
[0.5941] 
8.6515  
[0.2725] 
 
0.6136 
2.3208 
0.1092  
[0.9469] 
0.0938  
[0.9108 
7.4995  
[0.4838] 
 
0.6395 
2.1564 
1.4116  
[0.4937] 
1.2985  
[0.2907] 
2.9953  
[0.9347] 
 
0.6873 
2.2221 
1.4624  
[0.5637] 
0.9362  
[0.4086] 
8.8562  
[0.3546] 
Notes:     GR, IT, PT and SP stand Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain respectively; while hd, cd and pd stand for household, corporate and public debt respectively. 
 In the ordinary brackets below the parameter estimates, the corresponding t-statistics are shown, based on the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors 
 In the ordinary brackets below the parameter estimates, the corresponding t-statistics are shown, based on the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors proposed by 
Newey and West (1987). 
χ2N, χ2SC and χ2H are the Jarque-Bera test for normality, the Breusch-Godfrey LM test for second-order serial correlation and the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test for heteroskedasticity.  
The associated probability values are given in square brackets. 
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 Table 4a. Threshold model. Central countries. 
Panel A: Estimation results       
 
AT BE FI FR  GE   NL  
hd cd pd hd cd pd hd cd pd hd cd pd hd cd pd hd cd pd 
gt-1 
 
INFt 
 
ΔHKt 
 
ΔOPENt 
 
POPGROt 
 
GSt 
 
ΔdtI(dt>d*) 
 
ΔdtI(dt<d*) 
 
 
d* 
0.3812 
(2.9578) 
-0.1579 
(-2.9175) 
1.0575 
(2.8491) 
0.2201 
(4.4324) 
0.0386 
(2.8646) 
0.0411 
(2.8945) 
-0.2771 
(-2.9968) 
0.1290 
(2.8791) 
 
39% 
0.4619 
(3.5729) 
-0.1228 
(-2.9232) 
1.1273 
(2.8247) 
0.2860 
(4.5622) 
0.0774 
(2.7838) 
0.0622 
(2.7524) 
-0.2113 
(-3.2864) 
0.0542 
(2.8612) 
 
65% 
 
0.3980 
(2.8935) 
-0.1701 
(-2.8547) 
0.6369 
(2.9444) 
0.2524 
(3.5412) 
0.7719 
(2.8561) 
0.0431 
(2.8156) 
-0.0524 
(-2.9410) 
0.0398 
(2.8345) 
 
60% 
 
0.0826 
(2.9650) 
-0.2059 
(-2.8615) 
1.5200 
(2.8730) 
0.1326 
(2.9958) 
1.7896 
(2.8434) 
0.0990 
(4.2681) 
-0.2635 
(-2.9614) 
0.0965 
(2.8711) 
 
40% 
0.1164 
(2.9329) 
-0.2556 
(-2.9776) 
1.4224 
(2.8646) 
0.1350 
(3.8539) 
1.6550 
(2.7783) 
0.1059 
(4.5304) 
-0.0549 
(-2.8420) 
0.0066 
(2.8115) 
 
110% 
0.1468 
(2.9207) 
-0.1151 
(-2.8376) 
1.7559 
(2.7655) 
0.1005 
(3.2246) 
1.5868 
(2.8359) 
0.0829 
(3.4266) 
-0.0341 
(-2.8473) 
0.0061 
(2.7638) 
 
96% 
0.0060 
(2.9711) 
-0.3094 
(-2.8842) 
0.8464 
(2.7860) 
0.2582 
(3.1223) 
13.3835 
(3.9879) 
0.2690 
(4.7280) 
-0.3172 
(-2.8879) 
0.7080 
(2.8324) 
 
34% 
0.0349 
(2.9264) 
-0.3033 
(-2.9407) 
1.0339 
(2.8702) 
0.4096 
(4.2784) 
10.9080 
(3.9674) 
0.2224 
(5.0413) 
-0.5295 
(-3.7953) 
0.2433 
(2.8659) 
 
105% 
0.2867 
(2.8979) 
-0.2321 
(-2.8635) 
0.0700 
(2.8496) 
0.2632 
(4.1254) 
4.9110 
(2.7667) 
0.1733 
(4.0169) 
-0.4311 
(-3.3641) 
0.2408 
(3.1271) 
 
40% 
0.4901 
(3.3965) 
-0.0713 
(-2.8191) 
1.7175 
(2.8853) 
0.2517 
(3.5592) 
1.0355 
(2.7924) 
0.0018 
(2.8179) 
-0.2782 
(-2.8735) 
0.1466 
(2.9690) 
 
40% 
0.3768 
(2.9565) 
-0.0368 
(-2.8378) 
1.6387 
(2.8510) 
0.2409 
(3.1871) 
1.6401 
(2.8374) 
0.0033 
(2.8937) 
-0.2908 
(-2.9307) 
0.0570 
(2.8345) 
 
135% 
 
0.1592 
(2.9171) 
-0.1219 
(-2.8480) 
0.9103 
(2.8106) 
0.1602 
(2.8723) 
0.0882 
(2.7586) 
0.0889 
(2.8341) 
-0.2864 
(-3.6270) 
0.0487 
(2.8674) 
 
35% 
 
0.1382 
(3.1128) 
-0.2243 
(-2.9366) 
2.0515 
(2.9170) 
0.3854 
(5.6486) 
0.8180 
(2.8716) 
0.0006 
(2.9287) 
-0.1355 
(-2.8793) 
0.0936 
(2.8779) 
 
65% 
0.2537 
(2.8757) 
-0.1509 
(-2.9003) 
1.7604 
(2.9799) 
0.4122 
(5.1063) 
0.9903 
(2.8696) 
0.0060 
(2.8250) 
-0.0211 
(-2.9365) 
0.0280 
(2.9707) 
 
60% 
0.0676 
(2.9189) 
-0.2085 
(-2.9701) 
1.6316 
(2.9344) 
0.3980 
(3.9811) 
0.8069 
(2.7638) 
0.0022 
(2.9583) 
-0.1770 
(-2.9165) 
0.0571 
(3.1712) 
 
40% 
0.5486 
(3.7974) 
-0.3287 
(-2.9541) 
0.7420 
(2.7527) 
0.1377 
(3.2575) 
0.2997 
(2.8640) 
0.0469 
(2.8394) 
-0.0337 
(-2.9461) 
0.3754 
(2.9511) 
 
47% 
0.5662 
(3.9266) 
-0.4401 
(-2.9183) 
0.0409 
(2.8476) 
0.1223 
(2.8468) 
0.8598 
(2.9459) 
0.0454 
(2.8733) 
-0.0748 
(-2.8782) 
0.0230 
(2.8325) 
 
102% 
 
0.4578 
(3.3624) 
-0.4506 
(-2.9487) 
0.8853 
(2.8715) 
0.1179 
(3.2622) 
0.7978 
(2.7516) 
0.0642 
(2.8695) 
-0.2592 
(-2.9513) 
0.0218 
(2.8203) 
 
60% 
 
Panel B: Model Diagnostics 
      
Adjusted R2 
DW Test 
χ2N  
 
χ2SC 
 
χ2H 
 
0.6733 
2.2078 
0.9964 
[0.6076] 
0.6195  
[0.5463] 
4.7135  
[0.7650] 
 
0.6641 
2.1265 
1.4591  
[0.4821] 
0.4473  
[0.6444] 
9.0544 
[0.3377] 
 
0.6816 
2.1861 
0.2813  
[0.8688] 
0.4990  
[0.6130] 
7.7119 
[0.4614] 
 
0.6662 
2.3727 
0.6388 
[0.7283] 
1.1391 
[0.3362] 
4.4394 
[0.8155] 
 
0.5728 
2.1528 
0.7440 
[0.6833] 
2.2545 
[0.2287] 
5.8618 
 [0.6627] 
 
0.6678 
2.1871 
0.9011 
[0.6373] 
1.8948 
[0.1713] 
3.2244 
 [0.9195] 
 
0.6778 
2.4117 
0.7667  
[0.6867] 
0.6297  
[0.6924] 
7.6402 
[0.4694] 
 
0.7411 
2.2471 
0.0397  
[0.9804] 
0.5488  
[0.5844] 
3.0921  
[0.9284] 
 
0.7571 
2.2131 
2.2067  
[0.3318] 
1.5578  
[0.2392] 
1.6446  
[0.9900] 
 
0.6767 
2.2754 
1.2756  
[0.5285] 
1.4275  
[0.2588] 
6.3419  
[0.6090] 
 
0.5873 
2.2233 
1.7358  
[0.4198] 
0.9418  
[0.4033] 
4.8857  
[0.7697] 
 
0.6786 
2.1881 
2.0208  
[0.3841] 
1.0884  
[0.3522] 
0.9549  
[0.9985] 
 
0.6979 
2.3312 
0.7933  
[0.6726] 
1.0565  
[0.3534] 
6.8825  
[0.5494] 
 
0.6632 
2.2093 
0.9080  
[0.6351] 
1.1253  
[0.3404] 
4.1841  
[0.8401] 
 
0.6773 
2.2112 
1.0586  
[0.5890] 
0.7799  
[0.4693] 
3.3197  
[0.9127] 
 
0.6588 
2.2363 
0.6652  
[0.6357] 
1.1263  
[0.3401] 
10.5322  
[0.2296] 
 
0.6239 
2.2180 
0.7351  
[0.6517] 
1.2661  
[0.3009] 
7.9127  
[0.4420] 
 
0.6454 
2.2164 
0.7813 
[0.64111 
1.0447  
[0.3667] 
11.9384  
[0.2168] 
Notes:   AT, BE, FI, FR, GE and NL stand for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands respectively; while hd, cd and pd stand for household, corporate and public debt 
respectively. 
 In the ordinary brackets below the parameter estimates, the corresponding t-statistics are shown, based on the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors 
 d* indicates the estimated threshold in the debt/GDP ratio.   
 In the ordinary brackets below the parameter estimates, the corresponding t-statistics are shown, based on the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors proposed by 
Newey and West (1987). χ2N, χ2SC and χ2H are the Jarque-Bera test for normality, the Breusch-Godfrey LM test for second-order serial correlation and the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test for 
heteroskedasticity. The associated probability values are given in square brackets. 
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Table 4b. Threshold model. Peripheral countries.  
Panel A: Estimation results    
 
GR IT PT  SP  
hd cd pd hd cd pd hd cd pd hd cd pd 
gt-1 
 
INFt 
 
ΔHKt 
 
ΔOPENt 
 
POPGROt 
 
GSt 
 
ΔdtI(ΔdtI>0) 
 
ΔdtI(ΔdtI<0) 
 
 
d* 
0.6956 
(3.8584) 
-0.3282 
(-2.7342) 
0.5166 
(2.7251) 
0.0133 
(2.8119) 
1.7723 
(2.9354) 
0.1976 
(2.7586) 
-0.7607 
(-2.9171) 
0.5346 
(2.8994) 
 
32% 
0.7073 
(4.4791) 
-0.2385 
(-2.7425) 
0.4972 
(2.7249) 
0.0462 
(2.7408) 
1.8452 
(2.8378) 
0.1094 
(2.9228) 
-0.5550 
(-2.8235) 
0.0580 
(2.7648) 
 
52% 
0.4205 
(2.7976) 
-0.3245 
(-2.9230) 
0.1976 
(2.8103) 
0.0044 
(2.7847) 
2.7994 
(2.7619) 
0.1529 
(2.9539) 
-0.1440 
(-2.9542) 
0.0464 
(2.8711) 
 
71% 
0.1655 
(2.8455) 
-0.0572 
(-2.7762) 
1.0427 
(2.7648) 
0.3049 
(4.1812) 
1.8146 
(2.7612) 
0.0168 
(2.7613) 
-0.1172 
(-2.9741) 
0.7293 
(3.7289) 
 
19% 
0.2471 
(2.9131) 
-0.0292 
(-2.8405) 
1.3297 
(2.9124) 
0.2144 
(2.8369) 
2.2311 
(2.8268) 
0.0358 
(2.8988) 
-0.1842 
(-2.9172) 
0.1301 
(2.8578) 
 
61% 
0.2426 
(2.8477) 
-0.0900 
(-2.8888) 
1.0141 
(2.7499) 
0.2509 
(3.1804) 
1.5816 
(2.7537) 
0.0596 
(2.9162) 
-0.2821 
(-2.9449) 
0.1097 
(2.8614) 
 
90% 
0.4581 
(2.9148) 
-0.1163 
(-2.8568 
0.8297 
(2.7768) 
0.1279 
(2.7312) 
1.2847 
(2.8695) 
0.1256 
(2.9472) 
-0.1764 
(-2.9543) 
0.3889 
(2.8335) 
 
33% 
0.4709 
(2.9488) 
-0.0950 
(-2.8398) 
1.0094 
(2.7957) 
0.1281 
(2.7735) 
0.6516 
(2.7598) 
0.0911 
(2.8323) 
-0.1738 
(-2.8508) 
0.2181 
(2.7654) 
 
80% 
0.3036 
(2.9465) 
-0.0120 
(-2.7699) 
0.0863 
(2.8133) 
0.1374 
2.7649) 
0.3953 
(2.7449) 
0.0949 
(2.8475) 
-0.2074 
(-2.9400) 
0.0296 
(2.8110) 
 
50% 
0.8802 
(3.0305) 
-0.0114 
(-2.9152) 
0.7905 
(2.7667) 
0.1974 
(2.8723) 
0.3964 
(2.7170) 
0.0050 
(2.8124) 
-0.1924 
(-2.9296) 
-0.7396 
(-2.8585) 
 
40% 
0.8533 
(3.1630) 
-0.0890 
(-2.9202) 
0.7258 
(2.8614) 
0.3062 
(3.0701) 
0.1754 
(2.7349) 
0.0355 
(2.8211) 
-0.1846 
(-2.9342) 
0.2248 
(2.8698) 
 
95% 
0.3218 
(2.8527) 
-0.1132 
(-2.7810) 
1.2688 
(2.7901) 
0.1490 
(2.0466) 
0.4447 
(2.7594) 
0.1465 
(2.9624) 
-0.2970 
(-2.9764) 
0.0313 
(2.8763) 
 
50% 
Panel B: Model Diagnostics 
   
Adjusted R2 
DW Test 
χ2N  
 
χ2SC 
 
χ2H 
 
0.6316 
2.3005 
2.2877  
[0.3186] 
0.8302  
[0.4476] 
6.2949  
[0.6142] 
 
0.6824 
2.1822 
0.7561  
[0.6852] 
1.6307 
[0.2159] 
3.1782  
[0.9227] 
 
0.7103 
2.1493 
0.0312  
[0.9845] 
0.4180 
[0.6629] 
7.6419  
[0.4692] 
 
0.6112 
2.2567 
2.5389  
[0.2810] 
1.6747  
[0.2077] 
3.7351  
[0.8802] 
 
0.6404 
2.2311 
0.3742  
[0.8294] 
0.8491  
[0.4398] 
5.8636  
[0.6625] 
 
0.6714 
2.2381 
1.1246  
[0.5448] 
1.5284  
[0.2365] 
6.8805  
[0.5496] 
 
0.6415 
2.3691 
0.7757 
[0.6785] 
0.3948  
[0.6779] 
7.5708  
[0.4765] 
 
0.6762 
2.2233 
0.0647  
[0.9682] 
1.0446  
[0.3667] 
3.0960  
[0.9282] 
 
0.6762 
2.2191 
0.1476  
[0.9289] 
1.0446  
[0.3667] 
3.0960  
[0.9282] 
 
0.6568 
2.3149 
0.7465  
[0.6996] 
0.7698  
[0.4738] 
6.4329  
[0.5989] 
 
0.6607 
2.2845 
1.1876  
[0.5612] 
0.7427  
[0.4861] 
3.4514  
[0.9029] 
 
0.7887 
2.2153 
1.0470  
[0.5925] 
0.7515  
[0.4833] 
3.8619  
[0.8694] 
Notes:     GR, IT, PT and SP stand for Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain respectively, while hd, cd and pd stand for household, corporate and public debt respectively. 
 In the ordinary brackets below the parameter estimates, the corresponding t-statistics are shown, based on the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors 
 d* indicates the estimated threshold in the debt/GDP ratio.   
 In the ordinary brackets below the parameter estimates, the corresponding t-statistics are shown, based on the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors proposed by 
Newey and West (1987). χ2N, χ2SC and χ2H are the Jarque-Bera test for normality, the Breusch-Godfrey LM test for second-order serial correlation and the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test for 
heteroskedasticity. The associated probability values are given in square brackets. 
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